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Police Body Cameras: Go Big or Go Home?
RONALD J. COLEMAN
ABSTRACT
Police body-worn cameras have proliferated since the
deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, and the recent
George Floyd-related protests seem set to continue or even
accelerate that trend. Indeed, in her recent Nieves v. Bartlett
dissent, Justice Sotomayor took time to note that many
departments equip their police officers with body cameras.
Body camera advocates have touted the cameras’ benefits,
such as decreasing misconduct, reducing complaints, and
improving accountability. At the same time, serious concerns
have been raised regarding the impact of these cameras on
privacy, public resources, and fairness. Despite the increased
interest in body cameras, important empirical questions
regarding resources and benefits remain insufficiently
answered. This Article seeks to help fill that gap by analyzing
a large, recently released dataset. The Article’s primary
finding is that a more fulsome commitment to the body
camera program—or what this Article refers to as “going
big”—is associated with more favorable perceptions of the
resources required for, and benefits of, body cameras.
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INTRODUCTION

It is May 25, 2020, and police in Minneapolis arrest a
forty-six-year-old African American man.1 A convenience
store employee supposedly called 911 and reported that the
man purchased cigarettes using a counterfeit twenty-dollar
bill.2 Less than twenty minutes after the first squad car’s
arrival, the man is apparently pinned down, unconscious,
and not showing signs of life.3 Video footage appears to
reflect an officer’s knee on the man’s neck for almost nine
minutes while the man begs the officer to stop.4 The man is
George Floyd, and the wave of outrage and protests set off by
his and other recent killings recalls similar reactions
following the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner in
2014.5 Video footage has been central to several of these

1. Paul Butler, Filing Charges in George Floyd’s Death Was the Easy Part.
Now Comes the Hard Part, WASH. POST (May 31, 2020, 2:16 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/31/
filing-charges-georgefloyds-death-was-easy-part/; George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments
of
His
Life,
BBC
NEWS
(last
updated
July
16,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; Evan Hill et al., 8
Minutes and 46 Seconds: How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y.
TIMES (last updated Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/
george-floyd-investigation.html.
2. See sources cited supra note 1.
3. See sources cited supra note 1.
4. Blake Ellis and Melanie Hicken, Officer Charged with Killing George
Floyd Still Eligible for Pension Worth More Than $1 Million, CNN (June 12, 2020,
7:11 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/12/us/ chauvin-minneapolis-policepension-invs/index.html; see sources cited supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Poppy Noor, What the George Floyd Protests Have Achieved in
Just
Two
Weeks,
THE GUARDIAN
(June
8,
2020,
2:40
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/08/what-have-protestsachieved-george-floyd-death-police-funding-statues; Brandon Tensley, Ahmaud
Arbery and the Resilience of Black Protest, CNN (last updated May 12, 2020, 8:54
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/12/politics/ahmaud-arbery-black-protestpandemic/index.html; Josh Marcus, ‘She Was scared’: New Bodycam Video Raises
Questions in Breonna Taylor Case, THE INDEP. (Oct. 8, 2020, 12:18 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-body-camera-footagepolice-breonna-taylor-b870319.html; Joan E. Greve et al., Rayshard Brooks
Shooting: Atlanta Officer Charged with Felony Murder, THE GUARDIAN (June 17,
2020,
5:32
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2020/jun/17/
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events.6
In the years since the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric
Garner, use of police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) has
proliferated, and the George Floyd-related protests may
continue or even accelerate that trend.7 Indeed, in her recent
Nieves v. Bartlett dissent, Justice Sotomayor even took time
to note that many departments equip their police officers
with body cameras.8 BWC advocates have touted the
cameras’ benefits, including their potential to decrease police
misconduct and citizen complaints, as well as increase
legitimacy and accountability.9 At the same time, serious
concerns have been raised regarding the impact of BWCs on
privacy, public resources, and fairness.10 The last five-plus
years has also seen a rise in the quantum of BWC research,
as stakeholders seek to better understand the true
implications of BWC use.11
rayshard-brooks-charges-atlanta-police-officer-garrett-rolfe; Miranda Bryant,
Anger at Police Role in Mental Health Crises After Walter Wallace Jr Killing, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2020, 3:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/oct/28/walter-wallace-jr-hundreds-protest-philadelphia-second-nightpolice-killing; Julian Cummings et al., Philadelphia Police Bodycam Video Shows
Officers Trying to Get Walter Wallace Jr. to Drop Knife Before They Shoot Him,
CNN (last updated Nov. 4, 2020, 10:56 PM), https://www.cnn
.com/2020/11/04/us/philadelphia-police-walter-wallace-video/index.html;
infra
Part II.A.
6. See Ahmaud Arbery: What Do We Know About the Case?, BBC NEWS (June
5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52623151; sources cited
supra notes 1, 4–5; infra Part II.A.
7. See, e.g., Justin Sondel & Hannah Knowles, George Floyd Died After
Officers Didn’t Step In. These Police Say They Did – and Paid a Price, WASH. POST
(June 10, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/10/
police-culture-duty-to-intervene/; infra Part II.A.
8. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1739 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police BodyCamera Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1656–57 (2018) [hereinafter Democratizing
Proof]; Cynthia Lum et al., Research on Body-Worn Cameras: What We Know,
What We Need to Know, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 93, 94, 110 (2019)
(examining past empirical studies); Scott W. Phillips et al., The Impact of General
Police Officer Outlooks on Their Attitudes Toward Body-Worn Cameras, 43
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Notwithstanding the existing studies and normative
debates on BWCs, important empirical questions remain
insufficiently answered. For instance, are law enforcement
agencies prepared for the resource allocations necessary to
implement BWC programs? How satisfied are agencies with
the benefits of BWCs after adoption? And, would any factor
increase such preparedness or satisfaction? The purpose of
this Article is to help fill a gap in the BWC literature on
resources and benefits using a large, recently released
dataset.
The Article’s primary finding is that a more fulsome
commitment to the body camera program—or what this
Article refers to as “going big”—is associated with more
favorable perceptions of the resources required for, and
benefits of, BWC programs. Remaining parts of this Article
proceed as follows. Part II provides relevant background on
BWCs, including a discussion of the ascendancy of BWCs and
the risks and benefits advanced regarding their use. Part III
sets out the data, variables, and methodology employed in
the Article’s empirical analysis. Part IV presents findings of
the empirical analysis, including a discussion of limitations
and robustness. Finally, Part V concludes and suggests areas
for future research.

POLICING: AN INT’L J. 451, 451–52 (2020); Jordan C. Pickering, Officers’
Perceptions Regarding the Unexpected Effects of Body-Worn Cameras, 43
POLICING: AN INT’L J. 390, 390–92 (2020); Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of
and by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 543,
548–50 (2017); Mitch Zamoff, Assessing the Impact of Police Body Camera
Evidence on the Litigation of Excessive Force Cases, 54 GA. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2019).
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II. BACKGROUND ON POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS
BWCs are small recording devices positioned on an
officer’s person.12 They record what an officer “sees and
hears,” potentially capturing the officer’s actions or
interactions with others.13 Footage from such cameras might,
for instance, provide clarity on a disputed incident involving
an officer and member of the community.14
BWCs are made by companies such as Axon Enterprise,
Inc. (formerly TASER International, Inc.), and they vary in
price and configuration.15 Many offer cloud-based data
12. Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, Policing the Admissibility of Body
Camera Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1429–30 (2019); Danielle Evans,
Police Body Cameras: Mending Fences and How Pittsburgh Is a Leading
Example, 16 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 76, 76 (2015); Mary D. Fan, Privacy,
Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398
(2016) [hereinafter Public Disclosure]; Mindy Lawrence, Lights, Camera, Action:
The Age of Body Cameras in Law Enforcement and the Effects of Implementing
Body Camera Programs in Rural Communities, 91 N.D. L. REV. 611, 615 (2015);
Dru S. Letourneau, Police Body Cameras: Implementation with Caution,
Forethought, and Policy, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439, 442 (2015); Zamoff, supra note
11, at 8 (“Bodycams are small cameras that can be clipped onto a police officer’s
uniform or worn as a headset to record video and audio of law enforcement
encounters with the public.”).
13. Connie Felix Chen, Freeze, You’re on Camera: Can Body Cameras Improve
American Policing on the Streets and at the Borders?, 48 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 141, 155–56 (2017) (“[T]he cameras capture both video and audio recordings
of interactions from the officer’s perspective.”); Evans, supra note 12, at 76
(“These . . . cameras . . . are used to capture interactions between police and
civilians.”); Public Disclosure, supra note 12, at 398 (“Body cameras . . . are
capable of going everywhere police can go to record what the officer sees and
does.”); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 615 (“Body cameras . . . record the officer’s
actions and conversations with members of the public.”); Letourneau, supra note
12, at 442–43 (“Police body cameras are compact devices that can create both
audio and visual records of police officer actions, observations, and interactions
with the public. . . . Irrespective of differences among available devices, they all
provide the same basic function: recording what the officer sees and hears.”);
Zamoff, supra note 11, at 8.
14. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 12, at 76 (“[T]he captured video may be used
after an interaction to provide clarity on what exactly occurred during such an
interaction.”); supra note 13.
15. See Axon Products – Cameras, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/
cameras (last visited June 24, 2020); MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODYWORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 12 (2014) (discussing Axon system);

1358

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

storage.16 BWCs can be small and lightweight such that they
may be placed in a variety of areas, including on a uniform,
headgear, or even sunglasses.17
A. Ascendancy of BWCs
Scholars have identified a number of events encouraging
the adoption of police body cameras.18 Although it is not
possible to itemize all such events in this Article, a treatment
of certain key events will be helpful.
On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued an opinion relating to the New York City Police
Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 12, at 1431; Chen, supra note 13, at 155–56, 173
(discussing significant variation in prices between models and manufacturers);
Matthew A. De Stasio, A Municipal Speech Claim Against Body Camera Video
Restrictions, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 961, 962–63 (2018); Letourneau, supra note 12,
at 442–43; Zamoff, supra note 11, at 9 (“Axon, formerly known as Taser
International[,] . . . is the largest supplier of body cams in America today.
Different bodycam models have different features—all of which may impact the
quality of the videos they produce.”); see also Chauncey Alcorn, Police Body Cam
Maker Unveils New Features it Hopes Will Curb Officer Misconduct, CNN (Oct.
28, 2020, 9:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/28/tech/axon-body-cam-newfeatures/index.html (discussing “new features intended to help law enforcement
supervisors better monitor officers and curb problematic behavior”).
16. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 13, at 155–56 (“The majority of systems also
come with a cloud-based data storage service with built-in security features to
protect against tampering or destruction of video evidence.”).
17. Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 12, at 1429–30 (“The cameras are small
and versatile enough to be worn almost anywhere on a police officer’s person.”);
Chen, supra note 13, at 155–56 (“The typical police body camera consists of a
video camera, a microphone, a battery, and an onboard data storage system. The
hardware is lightweight compared to other police equipment, thereby enabling
officers to wear body cameras in a variety of positions. Most devices attach to the
officer’s uniform or mount to headgear.”); Evans, supra note 12, at 76 (“Body
cameras are small cameras, weighing approximately 108 grams, affixed to a
police officer’s shirt pocket, hat, collar, shoulder, or even a pair of specially
designed Oakley sunglasses.”); Public Disclosure, supra note 12, at 398 (“Body
cameras are small enough to wear at an officer’s eye level, head level, or chest
. . . .”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at 442 (“Officers wear them on their uniforms—
just like badges and firearms.”).
18. See, e.g., Kyle J. Maury, Police Body-Worn Camera Policy: Balancing the
Tension Between Privacy and Public Access in State Laws, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 479, 485–86; see also infra Part II.A.
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Department’s use of “stop and frisk.”19 The court found,
among other things, certain Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations and stated “the police are not
permitted to target people for stops based on their race.”20
Judge Scheindlin declared that she was “relegated to finding
facts based on the often conflicting testimony of
eyewitnesses” since there was “no contemporaneous
recording of the stop (such as could be achieved through the
use of a body-worn camera)[.]”21 One of the remedies Judge
Sheindlin ordered was “a trial program requiring the use of
body-worn cameras in one precinct per borough . . . .”22
Approximately one year later, two high-profile incidents
perhaps further spurred body camera adoption.23 On July 17,
2014, Eric Garner died in a confrontation with Officer Daniel
Pantaleo.24 News sources reported that video of the incident
reflected Garner being placed in what appeared to be a
“chokehold” and repeatedly saying “I can’t breathe” before

19. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). According to the opinion, the police department “made 4.4 million stops
between January 2004 and June 2012” and “[o]ver 80% of these 4.4 million stops
were of blacks or Hispanics.” Id. at 556.
20. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
21. Id. at 562.
22. Id. at 563; see also Laurent Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should
Own Police Body Camera Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 282 (2017) (“In New
York, a federal court in 2013 found that the New York Police Department’s stop
and frisk program violated the federal constitution and ordered the police
department to develop a pilot body camera program. . . . The court appointed a
monitor to make sure this all happened. The pilot program began in April 2017.”);
Maury, supra note 18, at 485 (“The court recognized the reasons why body camera
recordings can play a vital role in resolving the constitutionality of criminal
procedures . . . .”); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1363, 1364 (2018).
23. See infra notes 24–27.
24. Deborah Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man Dies After Chokehold by
Police, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/nychokehold-death/index.html; Associated Press, From Eric Garner’s death to firing
of NYPD officer: A timeline of key events, USATODAY (Aug. 20, 2019, 10:32 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/08/20/eric-garner-timelinechokehold-death-daniel-pantaleo-fired/2059708001/.
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dying.25 Then, on August 9, 2014, Officer Darren Wilson
fatally shot eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri.26 Commenters have argued that the public outcry
following these and similar incidents, along with the “Black
Lives Matter” movement, helped further encourage adoption
of BWCs.27
25. See sources cited supra note 24.
26. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald Q. Cochran, Police-Worn Body Cameras: An
Antidote to the “Ferguson Effect”?, 82 MO. L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2017) (“Police
officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown on August 9, 2014, in
Ferguson, Missouri.”); Iesha S. Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Police
Misconduct and the Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1811, 1813–14 (2015)
(On August 9, 2014, a county police officer fatally shot an eighteen-year-old
unarmed black man named Michael Brown. This incident led to the start of what
many termed an ‘uprising’ in Ferguson, Missouri.”).
27. See David K. Bakardjiev, Officer Body-Worn Cameras—Capturing
Objective Evidence with Quality Technology and Focused Policies, 56
JURIMETRICS J. 79, 79 (2015); Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 12, at 1430–31
(“The resulting public outcry [following the Michael Brown shooting], amplified
by the rallying cry ‘Black Lives Matter,’ marked the starting point of the body
camera revolution.”); Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I See? Problems with
Juror Bias in Viewing Body-Camera Video Evidence, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153,
154–55 (2018); Evans, supra note 12, at 76 (“After the police brutality deaths of
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Freddie Gray, amongst others, many call for
increased accountability through police officer body-worn cameras . . . .”); Katie
Farden, Recording a New Frontier in Evidence-Gathering: Police Body-Worn
Cameras and Privacy Doctrines in Washington State, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 271,
272–73 (2016); Ethan Thomas, The Privacy Case for Body Cameras: The Need for
a Privacy-Centric Approach to Body Camera Policymaking, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 191, 192 (2017); Karson Kampfe, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing
Privacy and Accountability Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1153, 1154–55 (2015); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 614–15 (“Both
civilians and law enforcement agencies began discussing the need for body-worn
cameras after two major events: the shooting of Michael Brown and the
strangulation of Eric Garner.”); Maury, supra note 18, at 480 (“The wake of
Brown’s shooting led to calls for policing reforms. At the forefront: the
implementation of police body-worn cameras . . . .”); Roseanna Sommers, Will
Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1307–09
(2016) (“As the list of African American men and boys killed by police grows
steadily longer, fueling the Black Lives Matter protest movement, advocates for
reform have enthusiastically embraced the idea of putting cameras on police
officers.”); Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1364–65; Zamoff, supra note 11, at 9;
Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1794–95 (2015). Even
Michael Brown’s family apparently expressed support for body camera adoption.
See, e.g., V. Noah Gimbel, Body Cameras and Criminal Discovery, 104 GEO. L.J.
1581, 1582–83 (2016) (“In November 2014, slain teenager Michael Brown’s family
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In the wake of these incidents, President Barack Obama
signed an order which established the “President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing”—made up of practitioners,
policymakers, and scholars—“that would examine ways to
improve distrust between communities and police.”28
President Obama proposed $263 million in spending to
increase body camera use, including $75 million to help local
governments with the cost of implementation.29 As part of
the allocation, the Department of Justice allotted $20 million
for body camera pilot programs.30 Attorney General Loretta
Lynch said “[b]ody-worn cameras hold tremendous promise
for enhancing transparency, promoting accountability, and
advancing public safety for law enforcement officers and the
communities they serve.”31 The American Civil Liberties
issued a statement urging supporters to ‘ensure that every police officer working
the streets in this country wears a body camera.’”); Chris Pagliarella, Police BodyWorn Camera Footage: A Question of Access, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 533
(2016) (“Brown’s parents themselves vigorously campaigned to place body
cameras on every law enforcement officer . . . .”).
28. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on
Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 882 (2015); see also Birck,
supra note 27, at 154–55 (“After Ferguson, President Barack Obama and his
administration proposed several law enforcement initiatives aimed at reducing
police violence, including equipping police departments with body cameras.
Commentators began to consider body cameras as a cure-all to the problem of
police violence, and body-camera use was supported widely, including by ‘the
public, the White House, federal legislators, police officials, police unions, and the
American Civil Liberties Union.’”).
29. Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 12, at 1431; Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra
note 22, at 283 (“[I]n December of 2014, then-President Obama promised $75
million toward purchasing 50,000 body cameras . . . .”); Sommers, supra note 27,
at 1307; Zamoff, supra note 11, at 11 (“In 2014, President Obama proposed
reimbursing communities half the cost of buying and storing bodycam video to
promote widespread bodycam adoption . . . .”).
30. Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 12, at 1431 (“In 2015, the DOJ announced
the $20 million Body-Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program as part of a $75
million investment in law enforcement agencies.”); Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra
note 22, at 281.
31. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 22, at 282; see also Gimbel, supra note
27, at 1584 (“[O]n September 21, 2015, Attorney General Loretta Lynch
‘announced that the Justice Department has awarded grants totaling more than
$23.2 million to 73 local and tribal agencies in 32 states to expand the use of bodyworn cameras and explore their impact.’”).
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Union, among other groups, also expressed some support for
body cameras.32
A number of initial empirical studies of BWCs had also
appeared to offer certain tentatively encouraging findings.33
One often cited study involved fifty-four police officers in
Rialto, California, randomly assigned to wear, or not wear,
cameras.34 The results of the Rialto study suggested that,
among other things, police officers who were not wearing
BWCs used force two times as often as those wearing
BWCs.35 Subsequent studies also seemed to offer certain
potentially promising results.36
Whether or not spurred by these events and studies,

32. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 22, at 279 (“In response to the killings
and other abuses caught on video, a broad coalition of voices, from the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to law enforcement, has called for police to wear
body cameras—both to help prevent and deter future misconduct and to
document it when it does occur.”); Simmons, supra note 28, at 883 (“The NAACP,
the ACLU, and The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law have
supported initiatives requiring police to wear body cameras.”); Sommers, supra
note 27, at 1310 (“Even the American Civil Liberties Union, normally an
opponent of increased government surveillance, sees body cameras as a ‘winwin.’”).
33. See, e.g., Pagliarella, supra note 27, at 535–36; Wasserman, supra note
11, at 548–50 (discussing studies); Chen, supra note 13, at 161 (same).
34. See Chen, supra note 13, at 161; Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at
1656 (discussing methodology and limitation of results); Pagliarella, supra note
27, at 535–36 (“Popular media often cite a study from Rialto, California . . . .”);
Sommers, supra note 27, at 1311; Mark Tunick, Regulating Public Access to Body
Camera Footage: Response to Iesha S. Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”, 67 FLA.
L. REV. F. 143, 143–44, 144 n.10 (2016); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 548;
Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1800 (discussing
methodology and noting study ran from “February 2012 through July 2013 . . . .”).
35. Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1656; Pagliarella, supra note 27,
at 535–36 (“[O]fficers wearing cameras were the objects of 88% fewer complaints
and cut their total use of force by 50%. Asked if this indicated better behavior by
police or by citizens, Rialto Chief William Farrar ventured that it was ‘probably
a little bit of both.’”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1800;
see Wasserman, supra note 11, at 548.
36. Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1656–57 (stating that “[p]romising
findings have been replicated in other police departments” but cautioning that
“other findings are mixed and concerning.”); Pagliarella, supra note 27, at 535–
36 (discussing use of force and complaints).
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body camera use seemingly proliferated.37 As one commenter
put it: “The adoption of BWCs is both widespread and
growing,” noting that officers, community leaders, activists,
elected officials, and others have identified a wide array of
possible benefits.38 Another commenter has even declared a
“body camera revolution.”39 Increasing use of BWCs may
implicate certain policy tradeoffs, however, and so
consideration of the perceived benefits and risks of such
cameras is also important.
B. Benefits and Risks of BWCs
A number of potential benefits and risks have been
advanced regarding BWCs. It is not possible to discuss all
such risks and benefits here, but some of the more common
ones are treated.40
1. Perceived Benefits of BWCs
The perceived benefits of BWCs include their potential
to: (i) decrease the rate of police misconduct and reduce use
of force, (ii) improve citizen behavior in interactions with
officers, (iii) decrease citizen complaints and improve
37. See, e.g., Gimbel, supra note 27, at 1584 (“This swift rise to prominence
has led many observers nationwide to predict that the universal use of BWCs by
police is inevitable.”); Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 22, at 273 (“Over the
past few years, scores of major cities, regional hubs, and smaller towns have
begun to deploy body cameras on their police officers to provide fuller evidence of
the interactions between officers and civilians. Nearly every large city plans
eventually to use them—95% according to a recent survey.”); Sacharoff &
Lustbader, supra note 22, at 282 (“[B]ody cameras have become perhaps the most
widespread organized response to communities’ cries for accountability,
reflecting the hope that they will bring about many improvements, including
deterring police abuse, quickly resolving complaints against the police, and
enhancing democracy and transparency more generally.”); sources cited infra
notes 38–39.
38. Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1421.
39. See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera
Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901, 938–39 (2017); see also Stoughton,
supra note 22, at 1366–67; supra note 27.
40. There are several ways to formulate these perceived risks and benefits,
and the formulation adopted by this Article is just one way.
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resolution of citizen complaints, (iv) increase legitimacy,
transparency, and accountability, (v) aid in training, and (vi)
provide evidence. Each of these perceived benefits is treated
in turn.
First, decreasing the rate of police misconduct and
reducing the use of force have been advanced as benefits of
BWCs.41 As the theory goes, when an individual knows he or
she is being recorded and that such recording could be used
as evidence, it may deter misconduct and encourage the
public and the police to behave better.42 Similarly, if officers
are aware they are being filmed and understand they will be
held to account, officers may be disinclined to use force
unless necessary.43
41. WHITE, supra note 15, at 20; Evans, supra note 12, at 77–81; Mary Anne
Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 475 (2017); Kampfe,
supra note 27, at 1162 (“Police officers do not always conduct themselves in a
professional manner, and officers themselves recognize the positive effect that
the cameras have on their conduct while working.”); Letourneau, supra note 12,
at 446 (“Proponents of police body cameras suggest that the mere existence of
such devices will positively impact officers’ behavior during interactions with
citizens.”); Maury, supra note 18, at 487–88; Simmons, supra note 28, at 885
(“There is a growing body of research that demonstrates that police body cameras
can help deter police misconduct.”); Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1382 (“Activists
who want to reduce the frequency of police uses of force, police executives who
want to increase officer professionalism, and the officers who want civilians to
resist less often have all championed body-worn cameras as a way to achieve the
desired behavioral change.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body
Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 837 (2015).
42. Evans, supra note 12, at 77–81 (“[B]y making officers more aware that
their behavior is being observed, body cameras deter officers from engaging in
inappropriate behavior.”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at 446 (“An officer
equipped with a body camera inherently creates an observable record of his or
her own behavior, a record potentially observable by others. Should the social
science hold true, the creation and potential observation of that record will lead
the equipped officer to more socially acceptable behavior.”); Maury, supra note
18, at 487–88.
43. Evans, supra note 12, at 77–78 (“Body cameras can potentially reduce the
amount of force an officer uses when engaging with a civilian in tense
situations.”); Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1162 (“[I]nstances of police use-of-force
have been shown to decrease by as much as fifty-eight percent by employing
PWBCs [police-worn body cameras].”); Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1383 (“[W]ith
regard to reducing violence, the objective is to discourage resistance by civilians
and gratuitously severe or frequent uses of force by officers, especially in the
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Second, improving citizen behavior in interactions with
officers has been suggested as a benefit of BWCs.44 Similar
to the argument that cameras deter officer misconduct, the
theory is that when citizens know they are being filmed, their
behavior may improve.45 It might be expected that citizens
in such situations would become “more respectful and
compliant.”46
Third, it has been suggested that BWCs will decrease
citizen complaints and improve resolution of such
complaints.47 The theory is that having access to the camera

context of deadly force.”).
44. See Evans, supra note 12, at 82; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at
309–10; Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1164; Letourneau, supra note 12, at 448;
Maury, supra note 18, at 487–89 (“Empirical research suggests body cameras do
have a civilizing effect on relations between law enforcement and the
community.”); Simmons, supra note 28, at 886 (“One police chief noted that his
department encouraged officers to let people know that they are recording
‘[b]ecause we think it elevates behavior on both sides of the camera.’”); Stoughton,
supra note 22, at 1383–84; Wasserman, supra note 41, at 837 (noting advanced
benefits include prompting public to behave better).
45. Evans, supra note 12, at 82; Maury, supra note 18, at 487–89 (“As
Lieutenant Harold Rankin of the Mesa Police Department observed, ‘[a]nytime
you know you’re being recorded, it’s going to have an impact on your behavior.’
This is true for law enforcement and citizens alike . . . informing citizens a camera
is running is ‘often enough to deescalate the situation.’”); Simmons, supra note
28, at 886 (“Just as officers behave differently when wearing the cameras,
members of the public may also alter their behavior if they know the cameras are
capturing their actions.”).
46. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 22–23; see also Letourneau, supra note 12,
at 448; Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1383 (“Civilians, meanwhile, may be more
likely to obey state laws as well as officers’ directives.”).
47. WHITE, supra note 15, at 23–24 (“Advocates of body-worn cameras have
also argued that the technology will facilitate quick resolution of complaints and
lawsuits against police officers.”); Evans, supra note 12, at 79 (“Several studies
also illustrate body cameras can expedite case resolution and prevent complaints
from even being filed.”); Franks, supra note 41, at 475; Gonzales & Cochran,
supra note 26, at 308–10; Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1165 (“In fact, empirical
studies have shown the number of complaints against officers reduced between
fourteen and approximately 89%.”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at 449–50
(“Records produced by body cameras have the potential to . . . provid[e] evidence
that can result in proper adjudication of complaints.”); Maury, supra note 18, at
487–88; Simmons, supra note 28, at 886; Wasserman, supra note 41, at 837;
Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1801–02.
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footage would facilitate efficient resolution of complaints
that are filed.48 Further, having a producible record of what
took place may decrease the likelihood that citizens would
file untruthful or frivolous complaints.49
Fourth, increasing legitimacy, transparency, and
accountability has been advanced as a benefit of BWCs.50 In
theory, when a department adopts a body camera program,
it may signal to the public that the department is responsive
and receptive to calls for accountability and transparency.51
When members of the public are given the ability to observe
potential police misconduct, they are able to hold the

48. Letourneau, supra note 12, at 449–50 (“Advocates allege that body
cameras can produce records of events that could expedite the resolution of
complaints and lawsuits against officers.”); Considering Police Body Cameras,
supra note 27, at 1801–02 (“Another benefit . . . is the ability of camera footage
to facilitate efficient resolution of citizen complaints and lower the overall
number of complaints filed in the first place.”).
49. WHITE, supra note 15, at 23–24 (“Citizens may be less likely to file
‘frivolous’ or untruthful complaints against officers wearing cameras because
citizens know that the video evidence can instantly refute their claims.”).
50. WHITE, supra note 15, at 19–20; Evans, supra note 12, at 82;
Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1664–65 (“The perception among the
disillusioned is that police-worn body cameras were presented to communities as
a tool for improved transparency and accountability to address longstanding
controversies over opacity.”); Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 310–11;
Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1163–64 (discussing legitimacy); Lawrence, supra note
12, at 616 (“One of the driving factors behind outfitting all law enforcement
officers with body cameras is to increase each officer’s accountability.”);
Letourneau, supra note 12, at 445–46; Maury, supra note 18, at 491–93;
Simmons, supra note 28, at 887 (“[B]ody cameras offer increased transparency
and accountability to the general public.”); Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1381–82,
1394 (“Police executives, politicians, and policing scholars have expressed their
hope that body cams would increase public trust or explicitly asserted that the
technology can or is doing so.”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27,
at 1803 (“That so many Americans feel they would be safer if all police officers
wore body cameras speaks to this technology’s potential to increase
accountability and transparency.”).
51. Letourneau, supra note 12, at 445–46 (“Police body cameras can
demonstrate to the public that the department using them intends to increase its
transparency and willingness to be examined by outside actors.”); Stoughton,
supra note 22, at 1381–82 (noting “adoption of a BWC system can serve as a
signal to community members”).
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misconduct to account using legal institutions.52 Increasing
transparency may also demonstrate a desire for justice and
fairness, which could lead to a perception of increased police
legitimacy.53
Fifth, proponents have suggested that BWCs are
valuable for officer training.54 Police training purportedly
prizes real-world experience and camera footage can help
reflect what to expect in the real world of policing.55
Reviewing camera footage may be particularly useful in
educating and monitoring new police officers.56 The video

52. See Maury, supra note 18, at 491–93; see also Letourneau, supra note 12,
at 445–50 (“The ability to accurately and more frequently place responsibility on
an officer when it is due should directly translate into increased departmental
transparency.”).
53. See Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1164 (“Increased transparency in these
situations demonstrates fairness and justice, leading to a perception of greater
legitimacy of police.”); see also Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 310 (“In a
recent survey of more than sixty police departments, the DOJ concluded that
cameras had the potential to promote ‘perceived legitimacy and sense of
procedural justice’ in officer-citizen encounters.”); Maury, supra note 18, at 491
(“Perhaps the greatest benefit of body cameras is the ability to restore faith and
confidence in law enforcement.”).
54. WHITE, supra note 15, at 25–26 (“Advocates of body-worn cameras have
also suggested the technology can serve as an important training tool . . . .”);
Chen, supra note 13, at 163 (“Body camera footage also assists departments in
developing better officer training programs, which benefits both civilians and
police.”); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 618 (“The possibility of departments being
able to use footage to train officers regarding the proper response in a given
situation is an additional benefit to issuing body cameras to officers.”); Simmons,
supra note 28, at 887 (“A Police Executive Research Forum survey found that 94
percent of the respondents use footage gleaned from body cameras to train
officers and to assist them in administrative reviews.”); Considering Police Body
Cameras, supra note 27, at 1802 (“Police departments also perceive these
cameras as helpful in the context of officer training . . . .”).
55. Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1397–98 (“As a number of scholars have
noted, police training heavily prioritizes real world experience, and video offers a
rare window into which would-be officers can see what the world is really like.”);
Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1802 (“Footage can be
incorporated into training programs to demonstrate what actual, on-the-ground
civilian encounters should (and should not) look like . . . .”).
56. Johnathan M. Nixon, Eye Spy Injustice: Delving into the Implications
Police Body Cameras Will Have on Police Officers and Citizens, 60 HOW. L.J. 719,
739 (2017) (“Police officers can use footage captured by body cameras to educate
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might aid in debriefing officers following critical incidents
(for instance, use of force), and in providing officers with any
necessary remedial training.57
Finally, provision of evidence has been noted as a benefit
of BWCs.58 Proponents suggest that objective footage from
BWCs could aid both prosecutors and those on the defense
side, for instance, by reflecting whether a search was
justified or a confession voluntary.59 Such video evidence
and train young and newly-admitted officers.”); Considering Police Body
Cameras, supra note 27, at 1802.
57. WHITE, supra note 15, at 25–26 (“Post-hoc review of officer behavior could
be especially useful when critical incidents, such as use of force, are recorded.”);
Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1397–98 (“Videos are also used to debrief officers
after critical incidents and to train them for high-risk situations such as active
shooters, armed encounters, and so on.”); Considering Police Body Cameras,
supra note 27, at 1802 (noting the ‘recordings [can] be used for remedial training
or correcting the behavior of individual officers against whom misconduct
allegations have been filed.’”).
58. Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1182 (“Underscoring these legal issues is the
role that PWBC [police-worn body camera] footage will be able to play as evidence
in trials.”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at 456–57; Stoughton, supra note 22, at
1393 (“In short, body-worn camera systems will not only provide comprehensive
evidence, by providing more information than currently exists, they will also
provide accurate and objective evidence.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at 738 (“Having
video records of police encounters could significantly bolster the preservation of
information, which could subsequently be used to review police conduct within a
department or used as evidence at trial.”); Wasserman, supra note 41, at 837
(noting supporters insist body cameras “will produce objective, unambiguous
evidence revealing what happened in future police-citizen encounters”);
Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1803 (“In particular, video
evidence has the advantage of ‘refresh[ing] the officer’s memory’ and ‘verify[ing]
the accuracy of written reports and statements surrounding [an] incident.’”).
59. WHITE, supra note 15, at 24–25 (“Advocates of body-worn cameras state
that the video evidence will facilitate the arrest and prosecution of offenders, as
it offers a real-time, permanent record of the events that transpired.”);
Letourneau, supra note 12, at 456–57 (“Many proponents of police body cameras
suggest that video evidence from these devices ‘will facilitate the arrest and
prosecution of offenders.’ . . . Recorded evidence also has the potential to
positively assist defendants in court.”); Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1394 (“Video
footage could also be used to support a police investigation or the ultimate
prosecution of an individual civilian. . . . By recording victim or witness
statements—particularly ‘good’ statements by confident, articulate witnesses or
visibly emotionally distraught victims with whom a jury is likely to sympathize—
officers can collect valuable evidence.”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra
note 27, at 1803.
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could also confirm the accuracy of reports or refresh a police
officer’s recollection.60 In turn, having access to BWC footage
may assist in factual determinations at trial and lead to
quicker and more just resolutions of certain disputes.61
Notwithstanding these purported benefits, certain
concerns with use of BWCs have also been voiced. It is to
these concerns that this Article will now turn.
2. Perceived Risks of BWCs
The perceived risks of BWCs include: (i) their potential
to create or exacerbate unfairness, (ii) privacy
considerations, and (iii) the resource costs associated with
them. Each of these perceived concerns is considered here.
First, concerns have been raised regarding the risk of
unfairness.62 Jurors could reach unjust conclusions based on
the video or discount other forms of evidence.63 It has been
suggested that the perceived “objectivity” of body camera
footage could lead to overreliance, even though, for instance,
the footage may mislead or biases may impact viewers.64
60. Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1803.
61. Maury, supra note 18, at 489–90 (“In criminal cases, a ‘permanent record
of the events that transpired’ will resolve cases ‘through guilty pleas rather than
criminal trials.’ . . . Body camera evidence can also lead to arguably more ‘just’
resolutions in legal proceedings.”).
62. See Franks, supra note 41, at 475; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at
319; Letourneau, supra note 12, at 460–63; Maury, supra note 18, at 491;
Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 22, at 276; Daniel Bernard Trimble, BodyWorn Cameras: The Implementation of Both the Police Department’s Rollout of
Cameras and the State’s Attorney’s Office’s Processing of Data for Discovery, 47
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 381–82 (2018).
63. Letourneau, supra note 12, at 460–63 (“[T]he use of body-cameraproduced evidence in trial creates a risk for a jury to come to improper
conclusions, such as making a finding not supported by the record or being
incapable of making a clear finding through just a recording.”); Maury, supra note
18, at 491 (“Indeed, jurors may discount other forms of evidence because visual
evidence is so compelling.”); Trimble, supra note 62, at 381–82 (“Nor can bodyworn camera data be the sole source of information to evaluate and make a fair
and impartial judgment of police action.”).
64. See Birck, supra note 27, at 176 (“The body-camera footage may simply
reinforce implicit biases that jurors hold, and thus do nothing to address the core
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Some have also argued that police control of body cameras
might permit officers to limit access to relevant footage or
manipulate the technology.65
Second, privacy-related concerns have been repeatedly
raised with BWC use.66 On the citizen side, privacy risks
problems the cameras were designed to address in the first place.”);
Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1662 (“The allure of video’s seeming
transparency into truth heightens the risk that viewers will miss the persuasion
effects and even potential distortion caused by angle, framing, perspective, and
the filter of one’s own preconceived notions.”); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 624–
25 (“Body cameras offer parties the chance to get an unbiased look into exactly
what occurred during a given interaction. Or do they?”); Nixon, supra note 56, at
732 (“Since these cameras do not offer a 360-degree view, some elements of an
encounter may be taken out of context or not properly captured at all.”);
Stoughton, supra note 22, at 1408 (“Beyond our own general tendency to view
(video) evidence in a way that confirms our preexisting worldview, there are
specific biases that can limit our ability to draw accurate conclusions from
video.”); Wasserman, supra note 41, at 840 (“[A]s any undergraduate film student
knows, what video actually says depends on a number of different
considerations—who and what is depicted, who created the images and how, and
details of the images themselves (length, clarity, lighting, distance, angle, scope,
steadiness, manner of shooting, quality); these affect the inferences that viewers
draw from video, allowing for many different possible meanings and
conclusions.”); Zamoff, supra note 11, at 18–19 (“Several observers have pointed
out that the inferences that judges and juries will have to make about video
evidence that is inherently ambiguous will reflect their implicit biases about race,
gender, and other characteristics.”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra
note 27, at 1812–14.
65. See Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1664 (“A third set of emerging
challenges with body-camera videos are controversies over refusals to disclose
recordings to the public or delayed disclosure.”); Franks, supra note 41, at 475
(“There are questions about how police officers can manipulate the technology,
from selectively turning cameras on and off to deceptively editing, mishandling,
or losing the footage.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at 734 (noting concern that “police
department or authoritative figures who may have something to lose, will use
their influence or access to body cameras to edit, or simply not record, body
camera footage for their own personal agenda.”); Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra
note 22, at 274 (“Police and prosecutors leverage their control of body camera
footage to pursue ordinary criminal cases. In these prosecutions, the government
may withhold these videos from defendants until after a plea, after a suppression
motion, and perhaps up to the eve of trial.”); Considering Police Body Cameras,
supra note 27, at 1806 (“But once the locus of control shifts to the officers, the
very organization meant to be held accountable will be able to prevent these
videos from being created in the first instance or shared after the fact.”).
66. WHITE, supra note 15, at 27–28 (“Critics of body-worn cameras have cited
numerous concerns over citizen privacy.”); Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and
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might include footage being released when those depicted (or
bystanders) would not want it released.67 Videos could, for
instance, be shared for an illicit purpose, such as to
embarrass a celebrity.68 Citizens may also be concerned with
impacts on their Fourth Amendment rights.69 On the police
the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2018) (“Body-worn
cameras on every police officer in America are understandably seen as a serious
threat to privacy.”); Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1169–75; Letourneau, supra note
12, at 453 (“Increasingly sophisticated technology poses a potential threat to
individual privacy, resulting in a tension between the benefit to the collective
good of such technology and individual freedom.”); Maury, supra note 18, at 492–
93 (“Placing an eye on what really happens to the public, though, presents the
issue of adequately protecting the privacy of individuals captured in
recordings.”); Simmons, supra note 28, at 889 (“By far, the fiercest opposition to
body cameras has come from groups concerned about the implications these
cameras have on privacy.”); Thomas, supra note 27, at 196 (“Body cameras
undoubtedly present risks to civilians’ privacy.”).
67. WHITE, supra note 15, at 27–28 (“Moreover, the potential for body-worn
cameras to be coupled with other technologies, such as facial recognition
software, may present additional concerns for citizen privacy.”); Evans, supra
note 12, at 83 (“While body cameras primarily allow the public to monitor the
government, body cameras pose a potential privacy invasion, particularly when
officers enter private homes and when officers encounter bystanders, suspects,
and victims in stressful and extreme situations.”); Franks, supra note 41, at 477
(noting “serious privacy questions” regarding consent of recorded civilians and
who may access footage); Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 314 (“A major
point of contention involving police body cameras relates to the privacy rights of
innocent bystanders captured on the video, such as family members.”); Maury,
supra note 18, at 493 (“The more access provided to the public, media, and
subjects of videos, the more opportunity for intrusion into the privacy interests of
those persons and places recorded on video.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at 733 (“The
accidental and incidental filming of individuals could raise concerns that,
although [a] body camera[] provide[s] an account of an officer’s actions, it
vicariously surveys those individuals who happen to fall within the range of the
camera’s view.”); Thomas, supra note 27, at 197 (“Body camera usage affects the
privacy interests of many more people than the direct subjects of investigation,
however. Bystanders or passersby, whether involved with the subject of an
encounter or not, will inevitably be captured on a large number of recordings in
both public and private settings, perhaps unaware that the police are filming.”);
Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1808.
68. Evans, supra note 12, at 83 (“Another privacy concern is with videos being
released for no particular purpose other than to embarrass individuals, such as
videos . . . with celebrity DUI stops or other similar situations.”).
69. Chen, supra note 13, at 164 (“Body cameras raise the age-old question of
how the Fourth Amendment applies to new forms of government technology.”);
Erik Nielsen, Fourth Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras, 48
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side, officers might, for instance, be concerned with their
privacy and autonomy while at work.70 Privacy issues for
police officers and citizens are compounded by the possibility
of long-term storage.71 For society at large, critics worry
about the threat of increased government surveillance.72
Finally, the resource costs associated with BWCs has
been advanced as a risk.73 In addition to the initial costs of
ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 120 (2016) (“In an era of ever-advancing technology, the
increased use of widespread video recording, although intended to prevent
misconduct of police officers, creates concerns over the Fourth Amendment rights
of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at
732 (“A primary concern that civilians have about the implementation of body
cameras is that these cameras will affect their privacy, with specific emphasis on
their Fourth Amendment rights.”).
70. WHITE, supra note 15, at 28–29 (“Officers expressed concerns over the
potential for supervisors to go on unsolicited ‘fishing expeditions’ in an effort to
find behavior that will get an officer into trouble.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at 733.
71. Democratizing Proof, supra note 11, at 1665 (“A related concern is that
communities—especially the most heavily surveilled, disadvantaged minority
communities—are paying the high privacy costs of more cameras without the
promised benefits.”); Franks, supra note 41, at 477 (noting “serious privacy
questions” regarding how footage will be stored and used); Gonzales & Cochran,
supra note 26, at 326 (“There are legitimate privacy concerns, both in terms of
the initial recording, as well as questions relating to the storage and release of
the recordings . . . .”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1808.
On the other hand, it has also been argued that body cameras may have certain
privacy benefits. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 199–202 (“Framing body camera
policy as merely a tradeoff between privacy harms on the one hand and
accountability benefits on the other takes an overly narrow view that privacy
interests can only be affected negatively by body camera proliferation. This view
fails to properly assess the overall utility of body cameras or particular policies,
because it excludes from the calculus the privacy benefits that may result from
more recording.”).
72. See Franks, supra note 41, at 476 (“Many well-meaning lawmakers,
activists, and members of the general public do not seem particularly attentive
to the fact that no matter how benign or socially useful, police cameras are a
powerful form of surveillance that have the potential to jeopardize the privacy of
individuals at their most vulnerable.”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra
note 27, at 1808–10 (“In a post-9/11 world, the addition of yet another form of
government surveillance should not go unexamined: recent technological
advances have allowed the state to move beyond the use of traditional electronic
surveillance devices—like wiretaps and bugs—toward more pervasive
surveillance techniques.”).
73. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 32–34 (“The resource and logistical issues
surrounding adoption of body-worn camera technology are considerable and, in

2020]

POLICE BODY CAMERAS

1373

implementing a BWC program, long-term usage requires
substantial ongoing expenditures, in particular for data
storage and manipulation, as well as for producing a
“courtroom-ready” product.74 The dollar cost of managing
and storing data can be “staggering” and may run into the

many cases, difficult to anticipate.”); Evans, supra note 12, at 90 (“Other
criticisms involve the cost of body cameras and the fact that many cities may not
be able to afford either the upfront cost or the cost to maintain the cameras’
storage database.”); Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 318 (“Technology such
as body cameras costs money, and many smaller or rural jurisdictions simply do
not have the resources to equip their police departments with body cameras.”);
Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1178 (“[D]epartments must find a substantial amount
of money to purchase the PWBCs [police-worn body cameras] and ancillary gear
to initially equip their officers.”); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 618 (“The average
cost of a new, high-definition, body-worn camera is $400–600.”); Letourneau,
supra note 12, at 451 (“The cameras themselves are expensive gadgets, especially
when multiplied by a department with a large number of officers.”); Nixon, supra
note 56, at 730–31 (“Many police departments that wished to implement body
cameras ran into issues with the cost of the equipment.”); Zamoff, supra note 11,
at 13 (“[T]he start-up cost of outfitting a force with bodycams is daunting for cashstrapped departments.”).
74. WHITE, supra note 15, at 32–34 (“Regardless of the approach taken, the
cost of data storage and management can be significant.”); Evans, supra note 12,
at 90–91 (“In addition to the high cost of purchasing and maintaining storage
data, criticism may also come from states and municipalities that cut funding
with certain programs and departments in order to reallocate the funds to
purchase body cameras.”); Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 318 (“The costs
of deploying police body cameras will likely include not only the costs of the
cameras, but also ancillary equipment, training in the use of the equipment,
protection and storage of the video, administrative and legal costs—including
responding to open records requests—and other costs related to data storage,
management, and disclosure to the public . . . .”); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 618
(“At first glance, it may seem that the cost of outfitting law enforcement officers
is simply the total of the equipment and training; however, the true cost lies in
storing all of the collected data.”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at 451; Zamoff,
supra note 11, at 14 (“Indeed, data storage costs often account for the majority of
bodycam programs’ total cost and represent a formidable barrier to the
implementation of bodycam programs—especially for small and medium-sized
police departments.”); Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1809;
Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1178 (“The most substantial cost of employing PWBCs
[police-worn body cameras] lies in the fee for storing the footage on secure servers.
This was a cost overlooked by many police departments who adopted PWBCs
early on.”). For instance, the “cost of reviewing footage for the purposes of
redaction and classification also poses a tremendous burden on police
departments.” Kampfe, supra note 27, at 1179.
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hundreds of thousands or millions.75
Notwithstanding the existing debates on BWCs,
important empirical questions on resources and benefits
remain insufficiently answered. The next Part sets out this
Article’s data, variables, and methodology.

75. See, e.g., Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 27, at 1809.
Proponents, of course, would likely counter that BWCs also have monetary
benefits. See Evans, supra note 12, at 80–81 (“While body cameras are expensive,
the Rialto study projected that the police department saved $4 in litigation costs
for every $1 spent on the cameras.”); Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 26, at 319
(“While the overall costs of body cameras are not insubstantial, particularly to
small, rural police departments, advocates of body cameras insist that over time
much of the additional expense will be offset by fewer civil suits against police for
misconduct, less administrative time for a department investigating a police
shooting, and fewer man-hours taken off the streets and dedicated to desk duty
or participating in a trial following accusations of a bad shooting.”); Lawrence,
supra note 12, at 620 (“Although it appears that body cameras are nothing but
bottomless money pits, they do have some monetary benefits, specifically in terms
of lawsuits against law enforcement agencies.”); Letourneau, supra note 12, at
456 (“The existence of a real-time, permanent record of the events of an arrest in
some cases can provide almost irrefutable confirmation of guilt. Such evidence
has the tendency to produce more guilty pleas and may preclude trials in many
cases, which would significantly reduce costs in police and court resources and
time.”); Nixon, supra note 56, at 738 (“When individuals do not file unfounded
complaints on police, police officers do not have to spend resources and manpower
to prove why these complaints are groundless.”); Zamoff, supra note 11, at 17 (“In
theory, this evidential ‘trump card’ could save the parties in excessive force
lawsuits significant time and money in the discovery phase of the lawsuit, as the
need for depositions and document discovery would be greatly reduced by the
existence of a video record of the event.”).
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III. DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODOLOGY
This Article analyzes data from the 2016 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
Body-Worn Camera Supplement (“LEMAS-BWCS”), which
was produced by the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research and authored by the U.S.
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.76 In this
Part, the dataset, variables, and methodology utilized in this
Article are described.
A. Data
The LEMAS-BWCS sample was drawn from a law
enforcement database consisting of 15,810 law enforcement
agencies: 49 primary state police departments, 12,695 county
and local police departments, and 3,066 sheriffs’ offices.77
Sheriffs’ offices and local police departments were chosen
utilizing a stratified sample design, and the “sample was
designed to be representative of all general purpose state and
local law enforcement agencies . . . .”78 The ultimate LEMASBWCS sample size was 4,976 agencies, and data was
collected through the web, a mail-in survey, and phone
interviews.79 The response rate was 79%, with 3,928 agencies
completing the survey.80 This Article focuses on the 1,915
agencies that reported they had acquired BWCs as of the

76. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATISTICS BODY-WORN CAMERA SUPPLEMENT (LEMAS-BWCS), 2016, 1, 4-5 (2016)
[hereinafter 2016 LEMAS-BWCS]. In the summary data description, the time
period is reflected as 2015-2016. Id. Although citations in this Article are to the
pages in the study codebook, the data is primarily drawn directly from the
associated Stata dataset.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id. The base weights are set out in the codebook. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 5–6. For more information on the LEMAS-BWCS sample, study
design, and limitations, see generally id.
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date of the survey.81 Such agencies included 13 primary state
police departments, 1,460 county and local police
departments, and 442 sheriffs’ offices.82
B. Variables
The outcomes of interest are the agencies’ perceptions
regarding the level of expense and staff time required to
implement BWCs and the agencies’ perceptions regarding
the benefits associated with BWCs.83 These variables were
drawn from the agency’s reported level of agreement with
specific statements utilizing the following answer choices:
“Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, “Agree”, and “Strongly
agree”.84
The independent variables included in the model fall into
three basic categories. First, variables relating to
motivations for BWC adoption. These variables were
included to explore the extent to which perceived motivations
for adopting a BWC program were associated with
perceptions of resources required and associated benefits.
Such variables were drawn from agency responses as to their
“most important reason for acquiring” BWCs.85 Second,
variables relating to the strength of BWC adoption. Inclusion
of these variables was important to analyze whether

81. The number of agencies who had acquired BWCs was determined from
results of question 10a in the LEMAS-BWCS survey. Id. at 16.
82. See generally id.
83. These variables are based on responses to question 52 in the survey. See
id. at 87–92. A sample of the full survey is also available in the back of the
codebook. See generally id.
84. Id. at 87–92. These four choices are basically analogous to a four-point
Likert-type scale. See Phillips et al., supra note 11, at 456; Natalie Todak & Janne
E. Gaub, Predictors of Police Body-Worn Camera Acceptance: Digging Deeper into
Officers’ Perceptions, 43 POLICING: AN INT’L J. 299, 303 (2019). The answer choices
“Don’t know” and “Too soon to know” are ignored for purposes of the model. 2016
LEMAS-BWCS, supra note 76, at 87–92.
85. These variables are based on responses to question 17 in the survey. See
2016 LEMAS-BWCS, supra note 76, at 45. Only those motivations with over 100
unweighted observations are included. Id.
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perceived satisfaction was associated with how long agencies
used cameras, how fully they deployed cameras, and the
relative number of cameras they utilized. Third, a variable
relating to agency type was included in the model. To control
for the possibility that the position of the primary state
agencies differed from that of the more local agencies, the
model included a state agency variable.
The dependent and independent variables included in
the model are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Variables Included in Model
Variable
Description
Dependent Variables
More Expensive

More Staff Time

Reliable Evidence

Protect from Complaints

Supervise Officers

86. Id. at 87–88.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. at 88–89.
89. Id. at 89–90.
90. Id. at 90.

Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
camera
implementation
was
more
expensive than anticipated”86
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
camera implementation required more
staff time than anticipated”87
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras provide reliable evidence of
officer-citizen interactions”88
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras have been useful in protecting
officers from unwarranted complaints”89
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras have been a useful tool for
supervising officers”90
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Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras have improved professionalism of
officers”91
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras have helped identify instances of
officer misconduct that might not have
been identified without them”92
Agency reported level of agreement with
the following statement: “Body-worn
cameras have improved relationships
between the agency and the community”93

Independent Variables
Motivation
Improve Safety

Improve Accountability

Improve Evidence

Improve
Community Perceptions
Reduce Liability

91. Id. at 90–91.
92. Id. at 91.
93. Id. at 91–92.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.

Agency selected “Improve officer safety” as
“the most important reason for acquiring”
BWCs94
Agency selected “Improve officer/agency
accountability” as “the most important
reason for acquiring” BWCs95
Agency
selected
“Improve
evidence
quality” as “the most important reason for
acquiring” BWCs96
Agency selected “Improve community
perceptions of the agency” as “the most
important reason for acquiring” BWCs97
Agency selected “Reduce agency liability”
as “the most important reason for
acquiring” BWCs98
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Reduce/Resolve
Complaints
More Prosecutable

Strength
Months of Adoption
Full Deployment

Cameras/Officers

Agency Type
State Agency
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Agency selected “Reduce or more quickly
resolve citizen complaints” as “the most
important reason for acquiring”99 BWCs
Agency selected “Make cases more
prosecutable” as “the most important
reason for acquiring” BWCs100
Number of months the agency had BWCs
at the time of the survey101
Agency selected “Full deployment to all
intended personnel” when asked how it
would describe the “current state” of BWC
deployment in its agency102
Approximate number of BWCs “currently
in service” per approximate number of
“full-time sworn officers with general
arrest powers”103
Agency was
agency”104

identified

as

a

“State

C. Methodology
This Article employs multivariate regression analysis to
study the relationship between the variables presented in
Part III.B. The model selected is an ordered logit.105 It is

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 21–23. This variable was derived from answers to question 11 in the
survey. Id.
102. Id. at 25. This variable was based on answers to question 13 in the survey.
Id. Those agencies who answered “Exploratory/pilot deployment”, “Partial
deployment”, or “Complete deployment for some assignments/partial deployment
in others” were not considered to have fully deployed cameras for purposes of this
variable. Id.
103. This variable was derived from answers to questions 8 and 12 in the
survey. Id. at 14–15, 23–25.
104. Id. at 12–13.
105. Ordered logit regression has been previously employed in examining data
in the legal and law enforcement contexts. See generally Christopher L. Griffin,
Jr. et al., Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1365 (2014) (analyzing criminal dispositions in DWI cases); Chris Guthrie
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appropriate to use such model with ordinal variables when it
is unclear that the distance between responses is constant.106
The model estimated is:
Yi* = bMotivationi + lStrengthi + dAgency_Typei + ei
where Yi* is the unobserved latent variable underlying
agency i’s measurement of the outcome of interest,
Motivationi are agency i’s ratings of each of the seven
motivation variables described above, Strengthi are the three
indicators of strength for agency i, Agency_Typei is one if
agency i is a state agency and zero otherwise, and ei is the
residual error.107
In the interpretation of the results, the focus will be on
et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) (analyzing judges); Milan Markovic & Gabriele
Plickert, The Paradox of Minority Attorney Satisfaction, 60 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
1 (2019) (analyzing minority attorney satisfaction).
106. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill & Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Does the
Public Care How the Supreme Court Reasons? Empirical Evidence from a
National Experiment and Normative Concerns in the Case of Same-Sex Marriage,
93 N.C. L. REV. 303, 336–37 (2015); see also Reeve T. Bull & Jerry Ellig, Statutory
Rulemaking Considerations and Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact Analysis,
70 ADMIN. L. REV. 873, 931 (2018) (“The dependent score variables are ordinal. An
analysis of the systemic problem that receives a score of two points, for example,
is not necessarily twice as good as an analysis that receives a score of one point.
Since the dependent variable is ordinal, the most appropriate econometric
method is ordered logit.”). In the context of this Article, ordered logit is employed
because, for instance, it would not be clear that the difference between “Agree”
and “Disagree” would be the same as the difference between “Agree” and
“Strongly Agree”. See Cahill & Rapp, supra note 106, at 337.
107. 2016 LEMAS-BWCS, supra note 76, at 87–92; Hosein Mohammadi et al.,
Application of Ordered Logit Model in Investigating the Factors Affecting People’s
Income (A Case Study in Tehran City), 5 INT’L J. ACAD. RESEARCH ECON. & MGMT.
SCI., 166, 169–70 (2015). The relationship between the observable variable (Yi)
and the latent variable (Yi*) is obtained as follows: Yi* = 1 (Strongly Disagree) if
-∞ <Yi*<µ1, Yi* = 2 (Disagree) if µ1 ≤Yi*<µ2, Yi* = 3 (Agree) if µ2 ≤Yi*<µ3, and Yi*
= 4 (Strongly Agree) if µ3 ≤Yi*<∞, i = 1, . . ., n. See Mohammadi et al., supra, at
169–70. Here, n is the number of observations and the µ terms denote cutoffs. See
id. Although the descriptive statistics in this Article use weights, the regression
analysis does not. See generally Gary Solon et al., What Are We Weighting For?,
50 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 301 (2015); Jin Young Lee & Gary Solon, The Fragility
of Estimated Effects of Unilateral Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates, 11 B.E. J. ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 49 (2011).
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the coefficients’ statistical significance, rather than their
magnitudes, since coefficients in ordered logit regression
lack the same straightforward interpretation as those in
ordinary least squares regression.108 The next Part will
discuss this Article’s empirical findings.

108. Bull & Ellig, supra note 106, at 931.
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IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This Part presents the Article’s findings based on
descriptive statistics and regression analysis. A discussion of
study limitations and robustness is also included.
A. Descriptive Statistics
As a preliminary matter, a number of descriptive
statistics from the LEMAS-BWCS study provide insights
into motivations, implementation, and outcomes.109 First,
the data suggests that in and around 2016 approximately
half of agencies (47%) had adopted BWCs.110
Second, approximately 60% of adopting agencies had
fully deployed BWCs to all intended personnel.111
Approximately 40% of agencies had only made
exploratory/pilot deployment, partial deployment, or full
deployment for some assignments and partial deployment for
others.112 Figure 1 reflects this BWC deployment status.

109. For purposes of these descriptive statistics, weights are used.
110. 2016 LEMAS-BWCS, supra note 76, at 16 (question 10a).
111. Id. at 25. It should be noted that missing values and observations not
providing helpful data for purposes of this Article’s focus—such as “Unsure/don’t
know” or “Don’t know”—are generally excluded in reaching and reporting the
Article’s findings. See generally id.
112. Id. at 25.
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Figure 1: Agency Degree of BWC Deployment113

Third, Figure 2 reflects which rationales are the
perceived primary drivers of BWC adoption at the
agencies.114
Responses
receiving
less
than
100
observations—including “Improve training”, “Improve officer
professionalism”, “Reduce use of force incidents”, and
“Simplify incident review”— are aggregated into the “Other
Reasons” category. As can be seen, 66% of adopting agencies
selected “Improve officer safety”, “Improve officer/agency
accountability”, “Reduce or more quickly resolve citizen
complaints”, or “Reduce agency liability”.115 The data
suggests that while officer training and reducing use of force,
for instance, may be raised as normative benefits of BWCs,
they are comparatively less likely to be the primary rationale
for agencies to adopt BWCs.116

113. Id. Of the agencies who reported that they adopted BWCs, approximately
69 agencies (or 4%) either failed to answer this question or answered
“Unsure/don’t know”. Id.
114. Id. at 45.
115. Id.
116. See id. This does not mean that the rationales receiving fewer
observations are necessarily less important generally, only that they are less
relevant as the most important driver of adoption.
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Figure 2: Agencies’ Most Important Reasons for
Acquiring BWCs117

Finally, Figure 3 reflects the agencies’ levels of
agreement with statements relating to perceptions of
expense, staff time, and benefits associated with BWCs.118
Figure 3 shows that over half of agencies agreed or strongly
agreed with the statements “Body-worn camera
implementation was more expensive than anticipated” and
“Body-worn camera implementation required more staff time
than anticipated”.119 This suggests that many agencies were
not prepared for the costs and staff resource allocations
required to implement their BWC programs.120 If policy117. Id. at 45–46. Of the agencies who reported that they adopted BWCs,
approximately 160 agencies (or 8%) either failed to answer this question or
answered “Unsure/don’t know”. Id. Although this table uses weights, it only
itemizes motivations receiving at least 100 unweighted observations. Id. Those
motivations receiving under 100 unweighted observations are aggregated into
“Other Reasons”. Id. Motivations within “Other Reasons” include: “Response to
external pressures (e.g. legislative, judicial or executive mandate from outside of
the police agency)”, “To receive funding that required purchase of body-worn
cameras”, “Strengthen police leadership”, “Simplify incident review”, “Reduce use
of force incidents”, “Improve officer professionalism”, “Improve training”, and
“Other (please specify)”. Id.
118. See id. at 87–92. These questions seek only the perceptions of the
agencies, which does not necessarily reveal an accurate picture of the agencies’
actual experience with BWCs.
119. Id. at 87–88.
120. See id. Moreover, although not apparent from the data, commenters have
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makers wanted to better prepare agencies for the resources
required for BWC implementation, one option could be to
encourage information sharing on effective costs between
agencies who have already adopted BWCs and those who
plan to adopt them. Figure 3 also shows that over 80% of
agencies agreed or strongly agreed with the statements
“Body-worn cameras provide reliable evidence of officercitizen interactions” and “Body-worn cameras have been
useful in protecting officers from unwarranted complaints”,
while less than half of agencies agreed or strongly agreed
that “Body-worn cameras have helped identify instances of
officer misconduct that might not have been identified
without them”.121 This might suggest that, for instance, if an
agency’s goal is to improve identification of officer
misconduct following the George Floyd-related protests,
different or additional strategic actions might be required.122

suggested that a substantial cost of BWCs also comes after implementation, such
as for ongoing data storage. See supra Part II.B.2. This could even increase the
need for agencies to be prepared to spend greater resources than anticipated.
121. See 2016 LEMAS-BWCS, supra note 76, at 88–91.
122. It could also mean other things, including that the perceptions of
respondents do not reflect reality.
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Figure 3: Agencies’ Levels of Agreement with
Resource and Benefits Statements123

B. Regression Analysis
Table 2 presents the estimates of the ordered logit
regression for the eight outcomes of interest. What emerges
from these results is that a greater commitment to a BWC
program—what this Article terms “going big”—is correlated
with more favorable perceptions of the resources required
for, and benefits of, BWC programs.

123. Id. at 87–92. Of the agencies who reported that they adopted BWCs, the
approximate number of agencies who failed to answer these questions or
answered “Don’t know” is as follows: (a) More Expensive than Anticipated (153
agencies or 8%), (b) More Staff Time than Anticipated (137 agencies or 7%), (c)
Reliable Evidence of Officer-Citizen Interactions (99 agencies or 5%), (d) Useful
in Protecting Officers from Unwarranted Complaints (127 agencies or 7%), (e)
Useful Tool for Supervising Officers (152 agencies or 8%), (f) Improved
Professionalism of Officers (204 agencies or 11%), (g) Helped Identify Instances
of Officer Misconduct that Might Not Have Been Identified (238 or 12%), and (h)
Improved Relationships Between the Agency and the Community (381 agencies
or 20%). Id. Please note, a greater number of missing values may increase bias.
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Table 2: Ordered Logit Regression Results124

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Coeff. (s.e.)

Improve AgencyCommunity
Relationships
Coeff. (s.e.)

0.002
(0.002)
-0.868***
(0.115)
-0.175*
(0.103)
-0.259
(0.727)
-0.144
(0.174)
-0.228
(0.178)
-0.266
(0.208)
-0.170
(0.242)
-0.469**
(0.200)
-0.428**
(0.190)
-0.091
(0.227)

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.981***
(0.116)
-0.280***
(0.102)
0.355
(0.676)
-0.176
(0.174)
-0.097
(0.177)
-0.423**
(0.207)
0.472*
(0.240)
-0.430**
(0.197)
-0.398**
(0.190)
-0.203
(0.224)

0.002
(0.002)
0.409***
(0.119)
0.000
(0.101)
-1.158
(0.732)
0.122
(0.186)
0.372*
(0.191)
0.080
(0.218)
0.239
(0.256)
-0.007
(0.209)
-0.073
(0.201)
0.274
(0.240)

0.007***
(0.002)
0.436***
(0.128)
-0.012
(0.109)
-2.209***
(0.796)
0.133
(0.201)
0.251
(0.204)
0.293
(0.240)
0.342
(0.287)
0.152
(0.230)
0.189
(0.216)
0.453*
(0.265)

0.003
(0.002)
0.476***
(0.126)
0.130
(0.107)
-2.257***
(0.709)
0.039
(0.202)
0.293
(0.203)
-0.169
(0.234)
-0.273
(0.282)
-0.106
(0.227)
-0.197
(0.218)
-0.059
(0.254)

0.004*
(0.002)
0.431***
(0.130)
0.067
(0.108)
-1.864*
(0.959)
-0.029
(0.211)
0.243
(0.214)
-0.462*
(0.247)
-0.396
(0.295)
-0.396*
(0.238)
-0.228
(0.229)
-0.289
(0.270)

0.006***
(0.002)
0.182
(0.129)
0.081
(0.115)
-1.247
(0.871)
-0.028
(0.212)
0.212
(0.215)
-0.581**
(0.249)
0.058
(0.299)
-0.272
(0.232)
-0.205
(0.227)
-0.413
(0.272)

0.007**
(0.003)
0.602***
(0.155)
0.017
(0.143)
-1.336
(1.217)
0.356
(0.252)
0.655**
(0.255)
-0.288
(0.293)
1.007***
(0.341)
-0.158
(0.280)
-0.286
(0.276)
-0.499
(0.316)

Number of Observations
X2

1,492
116.28

1,500
184.85

1,498
29.10

1,366
40.03

1,333
48.96

1,238
41.07

1,091
28.56

909
63.85

Prob > X2

0.000

0.000

0.002

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.000

0.051

0.011

0.018

0.020

0.016

0.011

0.034

More Expensive More Staff Time Reliable Evidence Protect from
Complaints

Months of Adoption
Full Deployment
Cameras/Officers
State Agency
Improve Safety
Improve Accountability
Improve Evidence
Improve Community Perceptions
Reduce Liability
Reduce/Resolve Complaints
More Prosecutable

Pseudo R2
0.032
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)

Supervise
Officers

Improve
Professionalism

Identify
Misconduct

The coefficient of Full Deployment is statistically
significant at the 1% level in all but one regression. This
coefficient is negative in the regressions of More Expensive
and More Staff Time, suggesting that agencies describing the
current state of their BWC program as “[f]ull deployment to
all intended personnel” are less likely to find that BWC
implementation was “more expensive” or “required more
staff time” than was anticipated.125 On the other hand, the
coefficient of Full Employment is positive in the regressions
124. See generally id.
125. Id. at 25, 87–88.
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of the perceived benefits Reliable Evidence, Protect from
Complaints, Supervise Officers, Improve Professionalism,
and Improve Agency-Community Relationships. This means
that agencies who have fully deployed BWCs are more likely
to agree that BWCs “provide reliable evidence of officercitizen interactions”, “have been useful in protecting officers
from unwarranted complaints”, “have been a useful tool for
supervising officers”, “have improved professionalism of
officers”, and “have improved relationships between the
agency and the community”.126
The coefficient of Months of Adoption is positive and
statistically significant in the regressions of Protect from
Complaints, Improve Professionalism, Identify Misconduct,
and Improve Agency-Community Relationships. This
suggests that the longer time an agency has had BWCs, the
more likely it is to perceive benefits.127 It is possible that
certain benefits of BWCs might not be immediately visible,
and that agencies may need to commit to BWC programs for
a longer period of time to fully enjoy these benefits.
The coefficient of Cameras/Officers is negative and
statistically significant in the regressions of More Expensive
and More Staff Time. This suggests that agencies with more
BWCs per full-time sworn officers are more likely to be
prepared for the cost and staff resources required for
implementing BWC programs.
Taken together, these results suggest that agencies who
“go big” might be more prepared for the resources required
for implementing their BWC programs and more likely to
perceive benefits of such programs. “Going big” might entail
agencies committing to fully deploying their cameras,
deploying more cameras per sworn officers, and employing
their camera programs for a longer period of time.

126. See id. at 88–92.
127. See id. at 89–92.
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C. Limitations & Robustness
The findings of this Article are subject to a number of
limitations, and several of the most noteworthy are worth
specifically emphasizing. First, there are data limitations, as
certain data was not available in the LEMAS-BWCS dataset.
For instance, the dataset only included information on a
subset of possible benefits.128 Similarly, it was not possible to
sufficiently control for an agency’s available resources using
the data. Second, there are issues of measurement. In
particular, reliance on agency respondent perceptions limits
the findings.129 For instance, it is possible that the results
reflect the perceptions of individuals completing the survey
rather than those of the agencies themselves.130 Perceptions
are also innately subjective and may change over time.131
Further, in relying solely on perceptions of agency
respondents, the results do not speak to perceptions of other
relevant stakeholders, such as community members, jurors,
or prosecutors.132 Third, although based on a national
survey, the findings might not be generalizable to all U.S.
law-enforcement agencies.133 Finally, this Article only makes

128. Id. at 45, 87–92. Importantly, this is in no way a criticism of the data
collection, as there may be good reason to limit the number of questions posed, so
as to avoid a burdensome and lengthy survey. See, e.g., Phillips et al., supra note
11, at 462.
129. See Pickering, supra note 11, at 400. Perceptions are different from
objective metrics of outcomes.
130. Although this may be an issue for many surveys, it would seem to be a
greater issue in the present context. For instance, in a household survey, the
respondent may be speaking for only several other people. In the context of the
LEMAS-BWCS survey, respondents could be speaking on behalf of a full agency.
131. For instance, an individual who is optimistic might be more likely to see
positive outcomes or an individual who had a positive experience with BWCs
directly prior to the survey may be more likely to reflect positive perceptions than
they would have days before.
132. See Pickering, supra note 11, at 400.
133. See Phillips et al., supra note 11, at 462; Pickering, supra note 11, at 400;
Todak & Gaub, supra note 84, at 310.
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claims in terms of correlation. As no causal claims are
advanced, concerns of endogeneity are diminished.134
Three checks were also performed to check robustness of
the findings. First, the regression was run using weights.
The results were qualitatively similar.135 Second, the
regression was run using ordinary least squares rather than
ordered logit. The results were also qualitatively similar.136
Finally, to ensure they were not improperly influencing the
findings, the regression was run without the motivation and
agency-type independent variables. Again, the results were
qualitatively similar.137

134. One particular endogeneity concern is the impact of agency resources.
Agency resources could theoretically affect both the independent and the
dependent variables in the model, and there was no way to adequately control for
it using the LEMAS-BWCS data.
135. The only difference important for the “going big” narrative is that the
relationship between the Cameras/Officers independent variable and the More
Expensive dependent variable is no longer statistically significant.
136. The only difference important for the “going big” narrative is that the
relationship between the Months of Adoption independent variable and the
Improve Professionalism dependent variable is no longer statistically significant.
137. The only difference important for the “going big” narrative is that the
relationship between the Months of Adoption independent variable and the
Improve Professionalism dependent variable is no longer statistically significant.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to help fill a gap in the BWC literature
regarding resources and benefits. Important study
limitations notwithstanding, the Article makes the primary
finding that a greater commitment to a BWC program—or
“going big”—is correlated with more favorable perceptions
regarding the resources required for, and benefits of, BWC
programs. The Article’s results suggest that agencies could
consider “going big” when adopting BWC programs if
governmental priorities and resources allow.138
There are a number of avenues for future research,
several of which are suggested here. First, as part of future
large-N datasets, it would be helpful to have objective
metrics on multiple outcomes in addition to data on an
agency’s perceived outcomes.139 Objective metrics would help
alleviate some of the limitations posed by relying on
respondent perceptions as a proxy. Second, it would be
helpful if such future datasets include perceptions of
multiple stakeholders rather than relying solely on agency
perceptions. Having perceptions of others—such as
community members, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
jurors—might help reduce bias and present a broader
perspective.140 Third, it would be helpful to have additional
data which is more easily decomposable by subgroups, such
as by race, gender, or disability status. Analysis of this data
might provide insights into whether results vary across
subgroups. Fourth, it would be helpful to build additional
panel data on outcomes, based on parallel questions posed

138. There may, of course, be other good reasons not to implement a large BWC
program, such as the privacy or fairness considerations mentioned in Part II.B.2.
A department may also prefer to take an incremental approach.
139. For instance, future large-N datasets might help illuminate the average
number of days for resolution of citizen complaints in agencies with BWCs as
opposed to those without BWCs.
140. See supra Part IV.C.

1392

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

before and after BWC adoption.141 This type of data would
permit analysis of changes over time, control for possible
effects of time-invariant differences between agencies on the
relationships studied, and potentially suggest further
relationships between motivations and outcomes. Additional
experimental data would be even more helpful to identify
causality. The hope is that this Article will encourage future
analysis into these and related areas, such that a more
fulsome, data-driven picture of BWC programs might
ultimately be revealed.

141. For instance, respondents could be asked about their level of satisfaction
with each of the primary motivations for acquiring cameras.

